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Do Bankers Use Managerial Discretion with Regard to CSR and Earnings Management to Rebuild Their Reputation in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis?

Do Bankers Use Managerial Discretion with Regard to CSR and Earnings Management to Rebuild Their Reputation in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis?

Ada Sneekes, Georgios Georgakopoulos, Alexandros Sikalidis, Maria Rodosthenous
Copyright: © 2016 |Volume: 3 |Issue: 2 |Pages: 28
ISSN: 2334-4628|EISSN: 2334-4636|EISBN13: 9781466693913|DOI: 10.4018/IJCFA.2016070102
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MLA

Sneekes, Ada, et al. "Do Bankers Use Managerial Discretion with Regard to CSR and Earnings Management to Rebuild Their Reputation in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis?." IJCFA vol.3, no.2 2016: pp.14-41. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJCFA.2016070102

APA

Sneekes, A., Georgakopoulos, G., Sikalidis, A., & Rodosthenous, M. (2016). Do Bankers Use Managerial Discretion with Regard to CSR and Earnings Management to Rebuild Their Reputation in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis?. International Journal of Corporate Finance and Accounting (IJCFA), 3(2), 14-41. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJCFA.2016070102

Chicago

Sneekes, Ada, et al. "Do Bankers Use Managerial Discretion with Regard to CSR and Earnings Management to Rebuild Their Reputation in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis?," International Journal of Corporate Finance and Accounting (IJCFA) 3, no.2: 14-41. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJCFA.2016070102

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Abstract

In this paper the authors examine the relationship between CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) performance and earning management in the banking industry from 2008 to 2012 having a specific focus on managerial behaviour and its impact on banks' reputation. They propose that when managers opportunistically engage in CSR, they will also engage in opportunistic earnings management but if they engage in CSR practices because it is the socially ‘right thing to do' then earnings will better reflect banks' true economic performance. Finally, they expect that when bank managers recognize the importance of societal trust they use their discretion to regain trust and to rebuild reputation. Their results show that in general, banks that perform high on CSR indicators behave more transparently with regard to the presentation of earnings. Banks that engage in CSR activities to improve their reputation, use managerial discretion to show socially desirable earnings numbers. For banks that value their reputation, pursuing societal trust is more important than the fulfilling of self-interest.

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