The Effect of Agency Problem and Internal Control on Credit Risk at Commercial Banks in Vietnam

The Effect of Agency Problem and Internal Control on Credit Risk at Commercial Banks in Vietnam

Quoc Trung Nguyen Kim
Copyright: © 2022 |Volume: 13 |Issue: 1 |Pages: 22
ISSN: 1947-9638|EISSN: 1947-9646|EISBN13: 9781683181330|DOI: 10.4018/IJABIM.305114
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MLA

Kim, Quoc Trung Nguyen. "The Effect of Agency Problem and Internal Control on Credit Risk at Commercial Banks in Vietnam." IJABIM vol.13, no.1 2022: pp.1-22. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJABIM.305114

APA

Kim, Q. T. (2022). The Effect of Agency Problem and Internal Control on Credit Risk at Commercial Banks in Vietnam. International Journal of Asian Business and Information Management (IJABIM), 13(1), 1-22. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJABIM.305114

Chicago

Kim, Quoc Trung Nguyen. "The Effect of Agency Problem and Internal Control on Credit Risk at Commercial Banks in Vietnam," International Journal of Asian Business and Information Management (IJABIM) 13, no.1: 1-22. http://doi.org/10.4018/IJABIM.305114

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Abstract

This study examines the effect of agency problem and internal control on credit risk under corporate governance theory at Vietnamese joint-stock commercial banks. Using the quantitative methods, including pooled Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed Effect Model, and Random Effect Model, this paper shows that the agency problem is a statistically significant variable. That means it is considered the most practical mechanism in corporate governance for controlling credit risk. Besides, the findings also highlight the importance of internal control components to monitor and mitigate credit risk.